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I. Introduction
The accession of the European Union (EU) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) will mark not only the beginning of a new era in terms of the protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe, but also in terms of the EU's participation in international courts and tribunals. Up until now, the EU has never become a party to an
international agreement with such a strong adjudicatory body. Therefore, it can be expected that the EU's accession to the ECHR will have important implications for the common assumptions surrounding the relationship between the EU and adjudicatory decision making of international organisations. 1 Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that the articulation of EU participation in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
will not be replicated in other international agreements with an international court.
Consequently, the examination of the mechanism envisaging the EU's participation in ECtHR proceedings undoubtedly raises many interesting issues as regards the EU's external representation. There are many noteworthy questions concerning the relationship between the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the ECtHR in institutional and substantive terms. This paper focuses on an institutional matter, namely, the EU's locus standi in the ECtHR. More precisely, it examines how the draft Accession Agreement 2 deals with the participation of the EU in the 2 proceedings of the ECtHR; in other words, how the co-respondent mechanism organises the participation of the EU and its Member States in ECtHR proceedings. The current institutional design of the ECHR, and more specifically the way in which the ECtHR works, leads to many problems linked with the future joint participation of the EU and its Member States: the lack of legal certainty as regards the respondent and the lack of unity when pleading or issues concerning the autonomy of the EU's legal order 3 create problems in terms of the EU's locus standi.
As a way of dealing with these issues, the draft Agreement and more precisely its Explanatory Report enshrine the so-called co-respondent mechanism. This legal device aims at alleviating the different tensions underpinning the accession of the EU, such as the different views on the division of competences, the autonomous nature of the EU legal order and the problems of legal certainty that the EU's participation can entail. However, a closer look at the co-respondent mechanism will show that certain gaps in accountability would still remain after the EU's accession. This chapter will proceed with this examination in three parts. First, it assesses how the co-respondent mechanism deals with the main interests affecting EU participation in the ECtHR.
Second, it shows how the principles that govern the relations between the EU and its
Member States affect their participation in the proceedings in front of the ECtHR. More specifically, it builds on recent developments in the case law of the CJEU on the duty of cooperation. Third, it examines whether the EU's participation in other international court proceedings can give us some clues as to how the duty of cooperation might operate when pleading in Strasbourg. More precisely, the issue of joint participation in front of other international courts will undoubtedly shed some light on how the EU and its Member States will act in the Strasbourg Court. In this regard, the chapter concludes that the design of the co-respondent mechanism could pose some problems as regards the autonomy of EU Member States when pleading in front of the ECtHR. It critically concludes that, although innovative, the co-respondent mechanism can restrict the autonomy of EU Member States in front of the ECtHR.
II. The Co-respondent Mechanism: Proceduralising the Problems www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008_final_report_ EN.pdf. 3 For an extensive discussion on the issue of the EU's autonomy and the accession to the ECHR, see A Torres Pérez, ch 3 in this edited collection.
A. Organising Principles of the Co-respondent Mechanism
The main reason behind the necessity of a special mechanism dealing with EU intervention stems from both the way in which the EU will accede to the ECHR and the sui generis nature of the EU. On the one hand, both the EU and its Member States will be party to the ECHR. The EU will not replace the Member States, so the division of competences and the allocation of responsibilities as regards the ECHR become blurred.
This becomes especially relevant when speaking about responsibility and locus standi.
If the division of competence is not settled, it becomes difficult to know who is going to be prima facie responsible and consequently who will plead in Strasbourg.
While formally the ECHR is not going to differ significantly from any other mixed agreement in terms of negotiation, conclusion and ratification, the institutional design of the ECHR, and more specifically the way in which the ECtHR functions, has the potential to intensify some of the problems linked to mixity. 4 The co-respondent mechanism would aim at alleviating precisely these problems. In this regard, the Explanatory Report to the draft Agreement clearly shows that the co-respondent mechanism is necessary in order to 'accommodate the specific situation of the EU as a non-State entity with an autonomous legal system that is becoming a Party to the Convention alongside its own member States'. 5 In other words, the ECHR will be a mixed agreement. Since both the EU and its Member States will be parties, the extent to which both of them are bound and responsible under the ECHR is unclear.
Moreover, the EU implements its acquis in quite a complicated manner, indirect administration being the most obvious example. In a nutshell, like other international organisations, the EU relies on its Member States for the application and implementation of EU law. 6 The decentralised application of EU law is guided by the States' compliance with the ECtHR outside of their control. They cannot simply disregard the Commission decision without a prior CJEU decision, which can take years.
The co-respondent mechanism envisages a procedure which tries to deal with such issues as a lack of legal certainty on the question of who should be liable for violations of the Convention or the autonomy of the EU legal order understood both as the independent legal personality of the EU and the division of competences. 20 In this regard, Article 36(4) ECHR as modified by the draft legal instrument provides that:
The European Union or a member State of the European Union may become a corespondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances set out in the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings.
This provision enshrines a procedure by which the EU and the Member States will jointly participate in the proceedings brought against any of them. The aim of this procedure, as mentioned before, is to create a balance between the sui generis nature of the EU and legal certainty for the parties to the proceedings. As the Explanatory Report shows, the co-respondent mechanism is 'a way to avoid gaps in participation, accountability and enforceability in the Convention system'. The mixed participation of the EU and its Member States combined with the complex nature of the EU's legal system could lead to gaps in responsibility, 21 which in this context means gaps in the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. Consequently, the co-respondent mechanism establishes that the EU and/or its Member States will take part in the proceedings whenever the compatibility between an EU law instrument and a provision of the ECHR is called into question.
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Furthermore, the protocol expresses another concern usually linked with the mixed participation in international agreements: the encroachment of competences by The protocol, like the arrangement, put forward the concern of certain Member
States with regard to the implications that the external representation of the EU has on the internal division of powers. 24 To deal with all these concerns, the draft Agreement establishes a new model of proceduralisation of the EU's participation in international agreements. So far, most of the procedures have been of an internal nature. They have either been internal arrangements between the different institutions of the EU or instruments with international legal effects, albeit unilateral and internal in nature. 25 As a general rule, procedures addressing the EU's participation in international agreements
were not included in the body of such agreements. They were required by the agreement, but they were considered an internal matter of the EU. The co-respondent mechanism breaks with this trend to a certain extent, since it appears that further internal rules on the EU's participation in the ECtHR are being discussed in the EU Council of Ministers.
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Moreover, it appears that the responsibility of the EU and its Member States will be joint unless the they decide otherwise. 27 Consequently, when the co-respondent mechanism is triggered, both the EU and at least one of its Member States will stand in front of the ECtHR to defend the compatibility of their actions with the provisions of 9 the ECHR. In addition, depending on the nature of the EU legal act called into question, the co-respondent mechanism lays down different procedures.
B. Scenarios that Trigger the Co-respondent Mechanism
The co-respondent mechanism establishes two different procedures depending on whether the breach stems from an EU primary norm (ie, the Treaties) or from a secondary norm (ie, regulations, directives, etc.). It lays down a procedure to involve the EU or its Member States depending on the type of act which caused the violation of the ECHR. If the breach stems from an EU primary norm, a different procedure will apply than if the breach stems from an EU secondary provision. By allowing the EU and/or its Member States to act as co-respondents, the draft Agreement tries to ensure, as pointed out before, that there will not be gaps in responsibility. However, a closer look at the corespondent mechanism shows that certain gaps in accountability would still remain after the EU's accession. This section is divided into three parts. First, it will examine how the co-respondent mechanism operates in cases in which the validity of EU primary law is put into question. The second part focuses on the validity of EU secondary norms, while the third examines other situations in which EU law can appear in an incidental manner.
i. Breach of the ECHR by Primary Law
To deal with breaches of the ECHR stemming from EU primary norms, ie, the Treaties, Article 3(3) of the draft Agreement provides that:
Where an application is directed against the European Union, the European Union member States may become co-respondents to the proceedings in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation calls into question the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a provision of the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or any other provision having the same legal value pursuant to those instruments, notably where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under those instruments.
The co-respondent mechanism thus tries to deal with situations like the one that occurred in Matthews. 28 The co-respondent mechanism recognises that in those cases in which the breach stems from a rule enshrined in a treaty, it is necessary to hold the Second, the wording of the co-respondent mechanism as regards breaches stemming from EU primary law seems to adopt a narrow approach to the situations in which these kinds of breaches might arise. The co-respondent mechanism rightly reflects that the most likely scenario in which this kind of situation might arise will be in cases brought against the EU. However, it cannot be excluded that a breach of primary EU law might also arise in proceedings brought against EU Member States. Yet neither paragraph 2 nor paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the draft Agreement allows EU Member States to become co-respondents in actions brought against other EU Member
States. So, should that claim be declared inadmissible ratio personae? Taking into account that the ECtHR allows individuals to bring cases without the need of legal counsel and how the EU's executive federalism dilutes the visibility of EU law, it would create an unfair burden on the individual if her claim is declared inadmissible and has to bring a new one. For instance, an individual could see her case declared inadmissible because it was not able to identify that her fundamental rights were violated not only by the Member State she is bringing the case against but also by a provision of the EU Treaties.
Overall, the co-respondent mechanism deals with most of the situations in which a breach of the ECHR might stem from a provision of EU primary law. However, the voluntary nature of the mechanism can create problems as regards the reparation of the wrongful act. Also, the co-respondent mechanism does not allow certain possibilities, such as permitting EU Member States to act as co-respondents in actions brought against other EU Member States, which could place an extra burden on the claimant.
The narrow wording of the provision combined with the voluntary nature of the mechanism cast some shadows over the practical effectiveness of the co-respondent mechanism.
ii. Breach of the ECHR by Secondary Law
Article 3(2) of the draft Agreement enshrines the way in which the EU and its Member
States will participate in those proceedings in which the compatibility of EU secondary legislation with the ECHR is called into question. The paragraph reads as follows:
Where an application is directed against one or more member States of the European Union, the European Union may become a co-respondent to the proceedings in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation calls into question the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a provision of European Union law, notably where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under European Union law.
The provision provides, inter alia, for the participation of the EU in proceedings brought against its Member States when they implement EU secondary legislation. In this regard, the Explanatory Report makes reference to the specific example of EU executive federalism as one of the reasons for the adoption of the co-respondent mechanism.
36
Member States implement EU regulations and directives on a daily basis. Therefore, questions on responsibility and locus standi in those situations are likely to appear in front of the Strasbourg Court. 37 Nevertheless, the provision is also designed to cover other situations. The use of the expression 'provision of European Union Law' also gives the EU the possibility to intervene in proceedings in which EU primary law is called into question. Therefore, if no discretion is left to the Member States, it can be assumed that not only the Member States against which the case is being brought is violating the ECHR, but also the other 27. Hence, why this differentiated approach?
Second, the draft Agreement includes in Article 3(7) a rule concerning the responsibility under the co-respondent mechanism. The paragraph reads as follows:
If the violation in respect of which a High Contracting Party is a co-respondent to the proceedings is established, the respondent and the co-respondent shall be jointly responsible for that violation, unless the Court, on the basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the co-respondent, and having sought the views of the applicant, decides that only one of them be held responsible.
The provision establishes the joint responsibility of the co-respondents as the general rule of responsibility. Leaving aside general considerations about joint responsibility and given the design of the co-respondent mechanism, establishing the joint responsibility of the EU and the Member State(s) which is a party to the proceedings 14 would seem a bit uneven for two main reasons. First, joint responsibility would be nonexistent if the individual would only have targeted the EU. Since EU Member States cannot join all the proceedings as co-respondents, 42 there might be a situation in which identical facts could lead to different responsibilities. 43 Identical facts could lead to either the EU's exclusive responsibility or joint responsibility of the EU and a Member
State depending on who the individual initially targeted. Second, if we assume that joint responsibility is necessary to strengthen the effectiveness of the judgment, then the other Member States which are not co-respondents should also bear the responsibility.
This becomes especially relevant in those situations in which there was no discretion for the EU Member States. These concerns show how joint responsibility within the corespondent mechanism has no legal foundations behind it. It has been assumed to be the easy solution as regards responsibility within the ECHR, but the drafters have not really thought about its position within the overall structure of the mechanism.
Moreover, these deficiencies in the mechanism have the potential to create legal uncertainty not only for the individual affected by the breach of the ECHR but also as regards the EU Member States. Consequently the proposed internal rules should really spell out the role of the Member States in the co-respondent mechanism well.
iii. Heterodox EU Law and the Co-respondent Mechanism
The Explanatory Report explains that the reasons for the adoption of the co-respondent mechanism model are rooted in the sui generis nature of the EU:
It is a special feature of the EU legal system that acts adopted by its institutions may be implemented by its member States and, conversely, that provisions of the EU founding treaties agreed upon by its member States may be implemented by institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the EU. With the accession of the EU, there could arise the unique situation in the Convention system in which a legal act is enacted by one High Contracting Party and implemented by another.
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In spite of this, EU law nowadays (and especially since the Treaty of Lisbon) does not always operate on the basis of the same principles which gave the EU legal order its autonomous character. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) would be a good example in this regard. To what extent would the actions of the EU Member States 42 They can only join those proceedings involving primary EU law: Article 3(3) of the draft Agreement. 43 It could be argued that even though the responsibility of the other subjects has not been declared, that responsibility would still exist nevertheless. However, the precise content, limits and scope of that responsibility are left to the ECtHR to determine. On the different perspectives on the rules on responsbility, see J D'Aspremont, ch 6 in this edited collection. 44 Explanatory Report, para 38.
by virtue of a CFSP provision fall within the scope of the co-respondent mechanism?
EU principles like primacy or direct effect seem not to apply in this part of the EU legal order. 45 Moreover, the CJEU lacks jurisdiction over this policy. 46 Therefore, it seems plausible to argue that in principle, the actions of the EU Member States falling within the CFSP would not be covered by the co-respondent mechanism. A previous version of the draft Agreement seemed to point in that direction. Article 59(bb) of the ECHR as amended by Article 1 of the draft Agreement would have read as follows:
[A]cts and measures are not attributable to the European Union where they have been performed or adopted in the context of the provisions of the Treaty on European Union on the common foreign and security policy of the European Union, except in cases where attributability to the European Union on the basis of European Union law has been established by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
47
This article created plenty of concerns as regards accountability and legal certainty. As a response, the European Commission assured the other parties that 'this rule would not have as effect to exclude any acts taken under the Common Foreign and Security Policy from the Court's jurisdiction but only to identify to whom the act is attributable'.
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Nevertheless, some High Contracting Parties were not convinced by the EU's statement. 49 The ECtHR's lack of jurisdiction over the CFSP would be very difficult to argue once the EU is a High Contracting Party to the ECHR. If the acts falling within the CFSP could be attributed to the EU, does it mean that these actions are attributable to its Member States? As a result, the Explanatory Report tries to clarify the situation by drawing a parallelism for the first pillar and equating the implementation of the CFSP with the implementation of EU law. 50 Therefore, by assimilating the CFSP into more orthodox EU legislation, the draft Agreement solves the question of whether the CFSP would fall within the scope of the co-respondent mechanism.
Conversely, some aspects in the area of freedom, security and justice are going to fall outside the scope of the co-respondent mechanism. More specifically, those aspects linked with mutual recognition, and judicial cooperation will not be covered by the co-respondent mechanism In these areas the EU only lays down a framework in 16 which the Member States operate. EU Member States do not implement EU law stricto sensu in these areas. This is reflected in the Explanatory Report:
It is understood that a third party intervention may often be the most appropriate way to involve the EU in a case. For instance, if an application is directed against a State associated to parts of the EU legal order through separate international agreements (for example, the 'Schengen' and 'Dublin' agreements and the agreement on the European Economic Area) concerning obligations arising from such agreements, third party intervention would be the only way for the EU to participate in the proceedings. The issue of the EU requesting leave to intervene will be dealt with in separate Memoranda of Understanding between the EU and the concerned States, upon their request.
51
Even in these scenarios, the EU would have a say as a third party instead of as a corespondent. Whereas there should not be a problem with leaving these areas outside the co-respondent mechanism and allowing the EU to intervene as another third party, the fact that they will also be left outside the cross-referral procedure between the ECtHR and the CJEU might be seen as problematic. The Explanatory Report links the possibility to refer an ongoing case in the ECtHR to the CJEU to those cases in which only the validity of the EU instrument is put into question. 52 Therefore, these scenarios would not be covered by the co-respondent mechanism or the cross-referral procedure, but perhaps in certain cases a potential interpretation of the CJEU might be required nonetheless.
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This section has shown how the draft Agreement and its Explanatory Report try to lay down a procedure to deal with the EU's participation in the ECtHR. The establishment of the co-respondent mechanism tries to ensure respect for the division of competence between the EU and its Member States while at the same time giving legal certainty to the individual involved in the proceedings. Nevertheless, the mechanism is not very successful in taking into account these two interests. On the one hand, the voluntary nature of the participation casts some doubts on the ex ante willingness of the EU and its Member States to assume their responsibilities under the ECHR. On the other hand, the mechanism should be more exhaustive in dealing with the different ways in which EU law could interact with the ECHR. Even though it is pointless to advance an alternative to the co-respondent mechanism, 54 it is submitted that the further No High Contracting Party may be compelled against its will to become a corespondent. This reflects the fact that the initial application was not addressed against the potential co-respondent, and that no High Contracting Party can be forced to become a party to a case where it was not named in the original application.
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The voluntary nature of the co-respondent mechanism raises many concerns. On the one hand, while it preserves the autonomy of the EU legal order, 56 it can potentially create uncertainty as to who is going to intervene in the proceedings. Allowing the EU and its Member States to decide whether to join can create inconsistencies as regards their expected intervention, since they might decide that for a specific case, it is better not to 55 Explanatory Report, para 53. 56 S Vezzani, 'L'Unione europea e i suoi Stati membri davanti ai giudici di Strasburgo: una valutazione critica del meccanismo del co-respondent', 2012, www.sidi-isil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/Simone-Vezzani-LUnione-europea-e-i-suoi-Stati-membri-davanti-ai-giudici-diStrasburgo-una-valutazione-critica.pdf.
intervene. Furthermore, as highlighted above, the voluntary nature of the mechanism can put its effectiveness at risk, especially in those cases in which unanimity is needed.
In a nutshell, the voluntary nature could also negatively affect the unity of the external representation of the EU and the coordination within the ECtHR. Since EU Member States are not obliged by the co-respondent mechanism, they could decide not to join the proceedings based on their own national interests. In this regard, it is argued that the duty of cooperation will play a fundamental role in the relationship between the EU and its Member States in the ECtHR.
B. The Duty of Cooperation and the Co-respondent Mechanism
Two issues will be discussed in this section: first, how the duty of cooperation would operate when the co-respondent mechanism is triggered; and, second, the implications during the proceedings. It is argued that, in the absence of any internal arrangements, the duty of cooperation has the potential to solve most of the problematic issues concerning the participation of the EU in ECtHR proceedings. Since the Convention and the Protocol thus create rights and obligations in a field covered in large measure by Community legislation, there is a Community interest in compliance by both the Community and its Member States with the commitments entered into under those instruments.
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By assimilating a mixed agreement to a pure EU agreement, 59 the Court not only expanded its interpretative jurisdiction over areas not covered by EU competence, it also showed that in mixed agreements, the relations between the EU and its Member
States are not regulated by international law, but rather by internal law. 60 Moreover, the special relation that the EU and its Member States have when implementing mixed agreements can impose stringent obligations on EU Member States that could also mean that they have to exercise their autonomous treaty-making powers. In the Berne Convention case, 61 the Court recognised that Ireland had failed in its obligations under EU law by not signing the Berne Convention, an agreement to which the EU was not a member due to its lack of competence on the issue. 62 In this regard, it has been argued that there is an EU interest in ensuring the implementation of mixed agreements in their entirety, regardless of the competence involved. 63 Therefore, inter alia, it could be argued that within the framework of the ECHR and its co-respondent mechanisms, EU Member States have an obligation as a matter of EU law to intervene in the co-respondent mechanism when invited to do so by the ECtHR. In this regard, a negative response would cast some doubts over their willingness to comply with the ECHR, which would go against the interests of the EU.
This would become especially relevant in those cases in which the participation of a Member State is needed, such as those in which the compatibility of the ECHR with EU primary norms is at stake. Thus, the duty of cooperation would, to a certain extent, limit
Member States' autonomy in deciding whether to intervene or not in a specific case.
Moreover, the Commission could bring an infringement action against EU Member
States for their decision not to intervene as a co-respondent.
ii. A Single Voice in Strasbourg
Besides limiting the scope of Member States' autonomy as to their decision to join the EU as a co-respondent, the duty of cooperation would also apply when pleading in the ECtHR. The duty of cooperation would not only ensure that a Member State becomes a co-respondent, it would also limit their autonomy on what exactly to plead.
Following well-established case law, 64 the joint participation of the EU and its
Member States in the ECtHR proceedings will undoubtedly require close cooperation and coordination. In this regard, this close cooperation would usually entail that EU Member States would not be allowed to deviate from the previously agreed EU position. In this particular scenario, this will entail not to argue differently from what the EU has argued. This could become a problematic issue given that the interests of the EU and its Member States could differ greatly.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This chapter has tried to show the current way in which the draft Agreement and its Explanatory Report deal with the EU's participation in the ECtHR's proceedings; it has yet to strike the right balance between the different interests involved, mainly the autonomy of the EU legal order and legal certainty. In this respect, the co-respondent mechanism aims at proceduralising the issue. This fact has two main consequences:
first, it postpones the solution to the conflict between the diverging interests to a later stage; and, second, any solution to this conflict or balance would be contextualised, ie. it would not be in principle possible to draw general conclusions on it. Whereas this managerial approach could be a good way to deal with mixed participation in international agreements, 65 the specific shape that it takes in the draft Agreement raises plenty of legal questions.
The co-respondent mechanism, with its voluntary nature and joint responsibility,
gives pre-eminence to the concerns over the autonomy of the EU legal order and the 21 concerns on legal certainty by the individuals suffering from human rights violations.
Inasmuch as the co-respondent mechanism allows the EU and its Member States to decide whether or not to join proceedings against the other, that decision would always have to be approached on an ad hoc basis which cannot be generalised, leading to uncertainty as to whether in similar situations the outcome for the co-respondent would be the same. It is submitted that another way to strike this balance is needed. Even joint participation in all cases (which would have no legal foundations whatsoever) would seem to be a better solution than leaving the decision to intervene (and to be held responsible) to the discretion of the EU and its Member States.
This chapter has also argued that insofar as there are not yet internal arrangements on the participation in the ECtHR, the duty of cooperation would play a very big role in this. Furthermore, in the absence of internal arrangements, the duty of cooperation could solve some of the problems entailed by joint participation. However, a duty does not entail a legal obligation, so it cannot be considered the panacea to apply in the absence of clear legal rules.
